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I. INTRODUCTION
Although the concept of pro bono publico, the rendering of an attorney's
services without or with substantially reduced compensation, has been
in existence for centuries, there has been an increasing interest in the
question of whether this public service can be made a mandatory one.
This new attention is due largely to the fact that while the right to
adequate assistance of counsel has been expanding, neither the federal
nor state governments have taken sufficient action to assure that counsel
will be provided. Since government funding does not appear to be meeting
the needs of the indigent in obtaining legal services, courts have increas-
ingly relied upon lawyers to represent the indigent without compensation.
Faced with the problem of limited governmental resources to meet a
growing need, the question arises as to the extent to which the donated
services of the bar can be relied upon to provide a solution. It is this
contribution by attorneys which has spawned considerable debate and
divided the bar into two opposing camps, those supporting and those
opposing a mandatory pro bono service requirement.
This note will explore the development of a mandatory service require-
ment by reviewing the American treatment of such an obligation. Some
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attention will be given to foreign approaches as well. In addition, the
need for legal assistance will be analyzed. Finally, in view of the uncertain
status of a mandatory pro bono system, suggestions for workable and
substantially enlarged voluntary programs will be made. Given the im-
portant need to provide legal assistance for the poor, the best strategy
may be to lay aside the constitutional and legal arguments both for and
against a mandatory obligation. Since the definitive case has yet to be
brought before the Supreme Court, more damage than good may be done
by supporters of a mandatory requirement if the outcome of such a case
would be to deny such an obligation. Rather than jeopardizing the real
needs of the poor by such a strategy, it seems that concentrating on efforts
to increase voluntary contributions, and promoting funding both on the
government's part and on the part of private charity, may be a better
way to assure that the guarantee of equal justice for all will become a
reality.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF A PRO BONO SERVICE REQUIREMENT
The historical development of a pro bono service requirement may be
traced on many fronts. The English tradition of providing attorneys for
the poor is often cited as a basis for a pro bono obligation in this country,
as is United States case law. In addition to this country's case law, the
practices of bar associations have reflected a varying commitment to pro
bono services. Treatment of the problem of providing the poor with legal
assistance and of pro bono services as a part of the solution in foreign
countries, particularly in western Europe, may lend some insight into
how the United States should proceed.
Both proponents and opponents of a mandatory pro bono service re-
quirement claim to have historical precedent on their side. Those in favor
of such a requirement trace their views to the early English practice of
providing representation to the indigent, as well as to some recent Amer-
ican case law. Opponents, however, question the validity of the propo-
nents' arguments which rest on those English traditions and also point
to a line of American legal precedent which is to the contrary.
A. The English Tradition
Because the American legal system draws so heavily from English
jurisprudence, many commentators on the subject of a mandatory public
service obligation have traditionally turned to the English treatment of
the subject in order to discern what the American bar's pro bono respon-
sibilities should be.
One of the earliest records of English courts requiring a seijeant-at-
law to represent an indigent with little or no pay occurred in the fifteenth
[Vol. 38:4
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century.' In addition, a statute first enacted in 1495 and continuing
through 1883 specifically provided that counsel would be assigned to an
indigent suing in forma pauperis, and that no compensation would be
given to counsel. 2 Court rules which continued to allow the indigent to
sue in forma pauperis later replaced the statute in 1883.3
Closer scrutiny of the English treatment of the poor and their access
to counsel, however, suggests that counsel was made available only on a
very limited basis. For example, although the statutes spoke of assigning
counsel to a litigant, unless the litigant had been allowed to proceed in
forma pauperis, the assignment did not require counsel to forego a fee.
4
The establishment of in forma pauperis status was itself fraught with
formidable obstacles which the plaintiff was required to overcome. For
example, the plaintiff was required to prove his poverty and to supply at
least two counsel to the court who would certify to the court that the case
had merit.5 Therefore, a reliance by proponents of a mandatory pro bono
obligation in the United States on the English precedent seems unwar-
ranted.
Another justification that proponents of a mandatory pro bono system
proffer is also deeply rooted in the English court system. Proponents argue
that the court's traditional control over "officers of the court" in England
is a factor upon which to base judicial regulation of attorneys in the United
States.6 However, doubt has also been cast upon this theory by scholars
who have analyzed the origins and development of the "officer of the
court" title, and the corresponding duty to serve the court. Such scholars
have found that there is no American counterpart to either the serjeant-
at-law or the English barrister.
7
I United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 636 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 978 (1965) (quoting 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 491 (3d
ed. 1923)). Holdsworth also mentions a request made by the plaintiffs of the court
that they be granted a serjeant "for that they are poor folk." Id. at 636 (quoting
2 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra, at 491 n.3). However, it is interesting to note that
neither the case nor Holdsworth indicates whether the court granted the request
for a serjeant. Shapiro, The Enigma of the Lawyer's Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 735, 740 n.21 (1980).
2 Shapiro, supra note 1, at 741 (quoting 11 Hen. 7, c.12 (1495)).
1 Id. at 741 (citing R. EGERTON, LEGAL AID 6-9 (1945)).
4 Id. at 745.
' Id. Before a plaintiff could sue as a pauper, he had to prove that he was worth
less than £5. He also needed to persuade two counsel that there was just cause
for his suit, persuade one of them to represent him in the suit, and prove the
latter by submitting a certificate to the court. If the plaintiff won, recovery by
counsel was often permitted. On the other hand, a losing plaintiff who was unable
to pay the defendant's costs was subject to be .'whipp'd' for wasting everybody's
time." Id. at 745 (quoting 16 C. VINER, A GENERAL ABRIDGEMENT OF LAW AND
EQUITY 259-260 (1st ed. 1743)).
6 Rosenfeld, Mandatory Pro Bono: Historical and Constitutional Perspectives,
2 CARDOZO L. REV. 255, 273 (1981).
1 See Martineau, The Attorney as an Officer of the Court: Time to Take the
Gown Off the Bar, 35 S.C.L. REV. 541 (1984); Shapiro, supra note 1. See also
Gaetke, Lawyers as Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39 (1989) (after review
of the current meaning of the "officer of the court" title, finds the characterization
to be "vacuous" and "unduly self-laudatory").
1990]
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B. American Case Law
In the United States, the development of a pro bono service requirement
by attorneys is closely linked to the right to be represented by counsel.
American courts have interpreted the constitutional guarantees of equal
justice, due process, and assistance of counsel," both in the federal and
state constitutions, to mean not only access to a court but also access to
an attorney. Yet neither courts nor any other institution of the govern-
ment necessarily made a corresponding provision to furnish funds to pay
for the attorneys needed to perform the task of representation. As such,
it seems appropriate to consider this growing right to counsel before
continuing to review the development of a pro bono requirement to meet
the need for representation.
1. The Expanding Right To Legal Counsel
The growing right of litigants to counsel in American courts can be
divided into two distinct lines of cases - criminal and civil. In criminal
cases, the right of an accused to assistance of counsel seems to be fairly
well established.9 In civil cases, however, that right is much less clear
and subject to considerable debate.
The right of an accused to counsel in criminal cases is unequivocally
stated in the sixth amendment of the Constitution and in provisions of
state constitutions. 10 In Powell v. Alabama," the United States Supreme
Court dealt with the issue of the right to counsel in a case involving a
state trial and conviction for the capital crime of rape. 12 The Supreme
Court expanded the federal constitutional right of an accused to counsel
in state, as well as federal courts, by making the sixth amendment ap-
plicable to the states by way of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.1 3 In addition, the Court concluded that under certain cir-
8 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
SJohnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
'o U.S. CONST. amend. VI states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, ... and to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence." Omo CONST. art. I, § 10 states: "In any trial, in any
court, the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and with
counsel."
11 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
12 Defendants were young black males accused of raping two white girls. The
incident is said to have occurred on a freight train on its way to Alabama. A fight
between several of the black and white males resulted in all but one of the white
males being thrown off the train. The two girls testified that they were then raped
by several of the black males. Word of the fight had been sent ahead and upon
reaching the next city, defendants were met by a sheriff s posse and a large hostile
crowd. Due to the hostile atmosphere, defendants were kept under military guard
during the proceedings. The record shows that defendants were young, ignorant,
illiterate, and were residents of other states and therefore had no aid from family
or friends available to them. Id. at 50-52 (emphasis added).
13 Id. at 71.
[Vol. 38:4
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol38/iss4/7
THE PRO BONO DEBATE
cumstances, the right to counsel required the court to assign such counsel
to indigent defendants to aid in the preparation and trial of the case.
Otherwise, defendants would be denied due process. The circumstances
requiring the court's assignment of counsel identified in Powell were the
defendants' youth, ignorance, illiteracy, the surrounding public hostility,
their imprisonment while in peril of their lives, and the fact that de-
fendants were from out of state and unable to communicate with those
who could have been of help to them in mounting their defense.
14
Several years later in Johnson v. Zerbst,5 a case concerning a federal
trial and conviction for counterfeiting, the United States Supreme Court
broadened the circumstances under which courts were required to appoint
counsel. The Court recognized that the average defendant, regardless of
special circumstances such as youth or illiteracy (which characterized the
defendants in Powell), lacked the legal skills necessary to protect himself.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that a defendant's right to counsel
in a federal trial required appointment of counsel unless that right had
been knowingly and intelligently waived.16
The right of an indigent accused of a crime to counsel at the state level
was first squarely dealt with by the United States Supreme Court in
Gideon v. Wainright.1 7 In this case, the Court affirmed that "any person
haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured of a
fair trial unless counsel is provided for him."18 While Gideon extended
assignment to ordinary felony cases, the Court later extended the right
of assignment of counsel to those misdemeanor charges which threatened
incarceration. 19
The right to counsel in civil cases, however, is less well defined and
consequently still subject to considerable controversy. In Lassiter v. De-
partment of Social Services,20 a parental termination case, the United
States Supreme Court held that the lack of appointed counsel did not
deny the defendant due process. The Court decided that the need for
appointment of counsel should be determined on a case by case basis.
Taking account of Mrs. Lassiter's lack of interest in the proceedings as
evidenced by her failure to appear at the custody hearings, or to speak
to a lawyer, the Court held that due process did not require the assignment
14 Id.
15 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
16 Id.
17 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
18 Id. at 344.
19For example, in Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the right to
appointment of counsel was extended to criminal appeals. Gilbert v. California,
388 U.S. 263 (1967), extended it to post-indictment lineups. In addition, Arger-
singer v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), held that persons charged with misde-
meanors who had a possibility of imprisonment were also entitled to appointment
of counsel.
1 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
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2. Compelled Uncompensated Legal Assistance
Absent government funding programs, the alternative of mandatory
pro bono has been urged. It is these mandatory calls to assist civil litigants
without compensation, that have spurred much recent debate. Proponents
of a mandatory pro bono obligation argue that there are no constitutional
of counsel for the defendant. 2 1 Because the Court's decision rested entirely
on the due process (i.e., fair trial) argument, there is still a question as
to whether the Court would require counsel based on equal protection
claims.
Several state and federal courts have interpreted the right to counsel
to include assistance when the defendant is already incarcerated due to
a previous proceeding and is then sued civilly in a subsequent proceed-
ing.22 In Payne v. Superior Court,23 the California Supreme Court rec-
ognized that the defendant, who was serving time for a previous
conviction, was physically unable, due to his imprisonment, to prepare
for his defense in a second (this time civil) suit.24 In Salas v. Cortez,25 this
same court refused to limit the right to counsel to those imprisoned. Here
the indigent defendant was being sued by the state in a paternity action.2 6
It is important to note, however, that in this case as in the criminal cases
in which access to counsel was deemed a right, the government, and not
a private party, was taking action against the defendant.
Generally, it seems that though the courts are unwilling to recognize
an absolute right to counsel in civil cases, they acknowledge such a right
when the facts of the case merit. Defendant's physical inability due to
incarceration to prepare for a defense or defendant's indigence in parental
rights cases brought by the state are two instances where courts have
determined that a right to appointed counsel exists. As a consequence,
of course, attorneys have been asked and often ordered by the courts to
serve, frequently without compensation.
Even though the constitutional right to counsel in civil cases has been
developing slowly, increasingly the right to counsel on the part of a civil
litigant has been based on statute. However, most legislatures have not
correspondingly expanded funding to provide for the counsel now man-
dated under statute.
21 Id. at 33. In addition to the fact that Lassiter failed to attend the original
hearing when her son was adjudged neglected and transferred into state custody,
the Court also took into account the fact that she had not contacted or inquired
about her son during the two years that he was in foster care. Id. at 21, 32-33.
22 For example, in Payne v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 908, 553 P.2d 565, 132
Cal. Rptr. 405 (1976), the Supreme Court of California held that the defendant,
who had been jailed after his conviction for receiving stolen property, was con-
stitutionally entitled to appointment of an attorney when he was sued by the
victim of the first suit for damages.
= Id.
'AId. at 923, 553 P.2d at 576, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 416.
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impediments to requiring such service of the bar and that there are policy
reasons and historical precedents on which to base the requirement.
27
Opponents, of course, argue that constitutional barriers do exist, that
statutory bases are questionable, that inherent judicial authority is un-
clear, and that policy arguments cut against any such requirement.2
The notion that courts have the power to appoint counsel cannot be
adequately relied upon to require that counsel be commanded to perform
without adequate compensation, as both attorneys and courts question
the extent of this statutory or "inherent" authority.
2 9
Several courts have repeatedly affirmed their own authority to appoint
counsel in civil cases and expect that attorneys will render their services
without compensation. 30 Some federal courts have based their authority
specifically on 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) which governs proceedings in forma
pauperis.31 Until recently, the question of whether § 1915(d)32 merely
permits courts to "request" that attorneys represent indigent litigants or
whether the statute permits courts to "require" that attorneys serve was
answered differently by many courts. For example, the fourth and eighth
circuit appellate courts held that § 1915(d) permitted mandatory assign-
ments of counsel, while the seventh and ninth circuits rejected the notion
that courts could compel attorneys to serve based on § 1915(d).33 The issue
has finally been resolved by the Supreme Court in Mallard v. United
States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa.34 In this case,
Petitioner Mallard, an attorney, was asked under the Federal District
Court of Iowa appointment system to litigate a case involving two current
inmates and one former inmate who were suing prison officials. 35 After
reviewing the case, Mallard filed a motion to withdraw, claiming lack of
familiarity with both the legal issues presented and with litigation, and
offered to volunteer his services in his area of expertise. 6 Mallard's mo-
27 See generally Rosenfeld, supra note 6.
218 See generally Gilbert & Gorenfeld, The Constitution Should Protect Everyone -
Even Lawyers, 12 PEPPERDNE L. REv. 75 (1984); Shapiro, supra note 1.
Mallard v. United States Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 409 U.S. 296 (1989)
(dealing with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1982)).
30 In re Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433, 330 N.E.2d 53, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1975); In re
Farrell, 127 Misc. 2d 350, 486 N.Y.S.2d 130 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
31 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1982) states that "the court may request an attorney to
represent any such person unable to employ counsel and may dismiss the case if
the allegation of poverty is untrue, or if satisfied that the action is frivolous or
malicious." (emphasis added).
32 Id.
22Peterson v. Nadler, 452 F.2d 754, 757 (8th Cir. 1971); Whisenant v. Yuam,
739 F.2d 160, 163 n.3 (4th Cir. 1984) (mandatory assignment of counsel is per-
missible); Caruth v. Pinkney, 683 F.2d 1044, 1049 (7th Cir. 1982); United States
v. 30.64 Acres of Land, 795 F.2d 796, 801-803 (9th Cir. 1986) (mandatory assign-
ment of counsel is impermissible).
34490 U.S. 296 (1989).
351d. at 299.
36 Id. Mallard offered his services in bankruptcy and securities law. Id.
1990]
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tion, however, was denied.3 The Court held that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) does
not authorize a federal court to require an unwilling attorney to represent
an indigent litigant.3 However, the Court took care to emphasize it did
not consider the question of whether the federal court possesses inherent
authority to require lawyers to serve, since the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of Iowa never invoked this authority when de-
manding that Mallard serve.3 9
Nor did the Supreme Court in Mallard decide whether other federal
statutes 40 authorize compulsory assignment, or if they in fact did, whether
such assignment would pass constitutional muster.41 However, at least
one court has denied the authority expressly given it by statute to appoint
an attorney. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama
in In re Nine Applications for Appointment of Counsel in Title VII
Proceedings42 rejected the authority vested in it by statute43 to appoint
counsel. In this case, nine plaintiffs sought free legal representation in
civil suits brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.44 The
court rejected the compelled service as void, basing its rejection on the
notion that such assignment created an involuntary servitude in violation
of the thirteenth amendment.4
Looking beyond statutory power, some courts have held that judges
have inherent power to assign counsel, whether such attorneys be com-
pensated or not.46 In fact, the Court of Appeals of New York in In re
37 Id.
38 Mallard v. United States Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 298
(1989). The Court engaged in an analysis of the meaning of "request" and found
that it was inconsistent with such verbs as "require" and "demand". Id. at 301-
308. Its analysis also included a discussion of congressional intent in passing the
statute. The Court concluded that due to Congress' awareness of more stringent
state practices which did allow compulsory assignment of attorneys, and due to
the differences in the wording of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(c) which imposes mandatory
duties on court officers and witnesses and was passed at the same time as 28
U.S.C. § 1915(d), that Congress intended only to ask for attorneys' services rather
than mandate them. Id.
39 Id. at 308 n.8, 310.
40 Other statutes to which the Court referred all used "appoint" or "assign"
terminology which the Court contrasts with the weaker verb "request". Id. at
302-307. Statutes which the Court referenced using the stronger terminology are
Act of Aug. 10, 1956, Pub.L. 1028, § 827, 70A Stat. 46, 10 U.S.C. § 827; Pub.L.
88-455, 78 Stat. 552 (1964), 18 U.S.C. § 3006A; Pub.L. 91-452, 84 Stat. 934 (1970),
18 U.S.C. § 3503(c); Pub.L. 95-144, 91 Stat. 1218 (1977), 18 U.S.C. § 4109; Pub.L.
95-608, 92 Stat. 3071 (1978), 25 U.S.C. § 1912(b); Pub.L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241(1964), 42 U.S.C. § 1971(f); Pub.L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 244 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-
3(a); Pub.L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 259 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); Pub.L. 89-793,
80 Stat. 1445 (1966), 42 U.S.C. § 3413(1). Mallard, 490 U.S. at 307 n.7.
41 Id. at 306 n.6.
42 475 F. Supp. 87 (N.D. Ala. 1979).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976) (allows the court to "appoint an attorney").
In re Nine Applications for Appointment of Counsel in Title VII Proceedings,
475 F. Supp. 87, 87-88 (N.D. Ala. 1979).
Id. at 88.
-In re Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433, 330 N.E.2d 53, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1975); In re
Farrell, 127 Misc. 2d 350, 486 N.Y.S.2d 130 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
[Vol. 38:4
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Smiley held that statutes merely "codify the inherent power of the
courts. ' ' 47 This case dealt with the issue of whether an indigent plaintiff
or defendant wife in a divorce action was entitled to appointment of
counsel; and if so whether the county was obliged to compensate counsel
retained by the women.48 In addition, some courts, such as the Supreme
Court of Tennessee and the Superior Court of New Jersey have not hes-
itated to find lawyers in contempt for refusing to obey their order to
serve. 49 Other courts, such as the Supreme Court of Missouri, find they
have no such inherent power to compel service. 5
Aside from the issue of the court's authority to appoint counsel is the
separate matter of a lawyer's ethical duty to accept such assignments
absent compensation. Again, courts have been split on the issue as to
whether there is an obligation of the profession to respond. United States
v. Dillon5' is one of the most frequently cited cases in this regard. In
Dillon an appointed attorney requested reimbursement for representing
an indigent prisoner.52 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that an
attorney has an obligation established by traditions of the profession
which requires that s/he represent individuals on court order even without
compensation. 53 Dillon,54 as well as other cases,55 held that the duty to
provide legal assistance to the indigent arises as a condition of occupa-
tional licensing.
Cases which oppose the notion that the bar has a duty to render legal
service without compensation can also be found. One of the earliest cases
which rejected the argument that attorneys should serve because of the
special privileges they enjoyed is the case of Webb v. Baird decided in
1854.56 Webb rejected the notion that any special privileges existed.
5
1
47 Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d at 438, 330 N.E.2d at 55, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 91.
- Id. at 437, 330 N.E.2d at 55, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 90.
49 Schoolfield v. Darwin, 182 Tenn. 192,185 S.W.2d 509 (1945); State v. Frankel,
119 N.J. Super. 579, 293 A.2d 196 (1972).
w State ex. rel. Scott v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757, 768 (Mo. 1985) (civil suit for
alleged medical malpractice).
51 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966).
52 Id.
11 Id. at 635. The court relied heavily on the appellant's brief which provided
a historical summary of the traditions of the profession in representing the in-
digent. Portions of the brief, found in the appendix to the case, expounded on the
English traditions of providing the indigent with representation. Id. at 636. See
Shapiro, supra note 1 (calling into question reliance on this "tradition"). See also
United States v. 30.64 Acres of Land, 795 F.2d 796, 800 (9th Cir. 1986).
346 F.2d 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1965).
55 State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 410, 217 A.2d 441, 447 (1966) (duty is an incident
of the license to practice law).
116 Ind. 13 (1854).
57 Id.
The idea of one calling enjoying peculiar privileges, and therefore being
more honorable than any other, is not congenial to our institutions. And
that any class should be paid for their particular services in empty honors,
is an obsolete idea, belonging to another age and to a state of society hostile
to liberty and equal rights. The legal profession having been thus properly
stripped of all its odious distinctions ... the public can no longer justly
demand of that class of citizens any gratuitous services which would not be
demandable of every other class.
Id. at 16-17.
1990]
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Some courts, although presupposing that a duty for attorneys to serve
exists, have relieved attorneys of their duty to represent the indigent and
thus have refused to require lawyers to absorb the full cost of represen-
tation of the poor.5
Even among courts that find the lawyer has a duty to represent the
poor, there is confusion as to whom the attorney owes the obligation.
Some courts hold that it is an obligation owed to the courts; others look
to the Code of Professional Responsibility to justify a duty owed directly
to the indigent; while still others have held that the duty is one owed to
the state itself.59
Compelling the legal profession to represent the indigent without com-
pensation also raises constitutional questions, which to date have yet to
be determined by the Supreme Court °. 6 The issues may be broken down
into several different concerns. One of the primary objections to a man-
datory pro bono service requirement is that it constitutes a "taking" of
an attorney's services without just compensation and thus violates the
fifth amendment.61 Another objection raised is that the requirement
would violate the thirteenth amendment's prohibition against involun-
tary servitude.6 2 Yet another concern is that such a requirement would
discriminate against attorneys as a class, and thus violate the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 3
With respect to the fifth amendment "taking" issue, the Dillon64 deci-
sion is once again illustrative of the arguments used to support a man-
datory pro bono service requirement. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit found that the attorney had no right to compensation for
his services because there has been no "taking" when an attorney is
compelled to fulfill a preexisting obligation taken on by entering the
5 State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 412, 217 A.2d 441, 448 (1966) (court specifically
found lawyer owed a duty to the court but refused to place entire burden of
providing counsel on lawyer). See also Bedford v. Salt Lake County, 22 Utah 2d
12, 447 P.2d 193 (1968); Bradshaw v. Ball, 487 S.W.2d 294 (Ky. 1972).9 In re Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433, 441, 330 N.E.2d 53, 58, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87, 94(1975), and In re Farrell, 127 Misc. 2d 350, 486 N.Y.S.2d 130 (Sup. Ct. 1985)
(obliged by Canons to perform duties to the indigent); State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399,
410, 217 A.2d 441, 447 (1966) (duty is owed to the court in contrast to duty owed
to the indigent); In re Nine Applications for Appointment of Counsel in Title VII
Proceedings, 475 F. Supp. 87, 89 (N.D. Ala. 1979) (duty is owed to the state).
10 It should be noted that one court has dealt squarely with the issue of whether
a bar association may condition membership upon a certain amount of pro bono
work being done by its members. The court held that it was both permissible and
proper for a voluntary bar association to require this commitment of its members.
It is unlikely, however, that it would extend this ruling to include all bar asso-
ciations since this court in the same case also held that an attorney could not be
compelled to represent an indigent client. State ex. rel. Scott v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d
757 (Mo. 1985) (emphasis added).
61 U.S. CONST. amend. V provides: "nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation."
62 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIII, § 1.
63 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965).
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profession.6 5 Finding no "taking", the court did not reach the question of
whether the services rendered by the lawyer constituted "property"
within the meaning of the term as used in the fifth amendment
6 Courts
which followed the same analysis as the Dillon court include the Supreme
Court of New Jersey in State v. Rush,67 and more recently the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. 30.64 Acres of Land.6
On the other hand, many courts have found arguments for a pro bono
requirement unpersuasive. For example, courts holding an unconstitu-
tional "taking" have often based their decision in part on finding that a
lawyer's services are a form of property.6 9 Those courts have found that
the burden has reached the point of becoming a "substantial deprivation
of property" and therefore constitutionally infirm.
70
There is also a line of thought which rejects the idea that the obligation
is valid as a licensing requirement of attorneys or that attorneys have a
duty to render the service because of the monopoly that such a license
grants them.71 The Supreme Court of Missouri, when discussing the mo-
nopoly issue in State ex. rel. Scott v. Roper,72 systematically rejected it
substantially on three grounds.73 First, the court questioned whether a
"Id. at 635.
"Id. at 636.
67 46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441 (1966).
795 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1986).
The Supreme Court of Utah in Bedford v. Salt Lake County, 22 Utah 2d 12,
447 P.2d 193 (1968), stated:
[T]he legislature can no more require a lawyer to represent a client for free
than it can compel a physician to treat a sick or injured indigent patient
without pay .... The legal assistance which an attorney renders to a client
is his stock in trade; and in order for the attorney to make a living, he must
sell his service.
Id. at 14-15, 447 P.2d at 194-95. Also, "[i]t has been said that the right to practice
a profession is a 'valuable property right"'. Menin v. Menin, 79 Misc. 2d 285, 292,
359 N.Y.S.2d 721, 729 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (quoting In re Bender v. Board of Regents,
Etc., 262 A.D. 627, 631, 30 N.Y.S.2d 779, 784 (1941)).
70 Bradshaw v. Ball, 487 S.W.2d 294, 298 (Ky. 1972).
71 Knox County Council v. State ex. rel. McCormick, 217 Ind. 493, 29 N.E.2d
405 (1940). The court found that the mere power to license certain occupations
does not justify a taking of property.
The Legislature may in the future require the licensing of restaurant op-
erators and grocers .... If a law should be enacted requiring every person
licensed by the state to render services, or furnish the materials of their
business, to paupers gratuitously, much difficulty would be found in justi-
fying a decision holding the law unconstitutional as depriving the green
grocer or the restaurant operator of his goods, or as depriving the physician,
or the barber, or the plumber, or the electrician, or the mechanical engineer
of his services, without compensation, while adhering to a rule that licensed
attorneys' services may be taken without compensation.
Id. at 499, 29 N.E.2d at 412. See also Cunningham v. Superior Court, 177 Cal.
App. 3d 336, 347, 222 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1986) (stating that "[t]he right to practice
law, or to engage in an occupation requiring a state license, must not be predicated
upon the relinquishment of constitutional rights").
72 688 S.W.2d 757 (Mo. 1985).
73 Id.
1990]
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1990
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
monopoly in fact existed since no individual was restrained from arguing
his own case.14 Second, the licensing requirements were for the purpose
of protecting the public and assuring minimum standards of competence,
not for the purpose of limiting competition and assuring advantage for
attorneys. 75 Lastly, the court found that the monopoly argument used to
compel service of attorneys must "rest upon some unstated assumption,
otherwise members of all occupations licensed by the state could be com-
pelled to render gratuitous service. '7 6
In marshalling support for their position, opponents of a mandatory
pro bono service requirement frequently point to the thirteenth amend-
ment's prohibition against involuntary servitude. Although this theory
has attracted a few followers, 7  the stronger argument is that the thir-
teenth amendment was designed to abolish slavery and does not contem-
plate prohibition of the type of mandatory service which is at issue here. 7
Lastly, the argument is made that compelled service denies attorneys
their right to equal protection and discriminates against them as a class
by requiring them to pay for the cost of providing legal representation
to those who cannot otherwise afford it. Again, cases which have dealt
with this issue have resulted in mixed decisions. 79 In State v. Rush,80 the
Supreme Court of New Jersey found no constitutional obstacle, equal
protection or otherwise, to compelled uncompensated assistance of coun-
sel. But the court did concede that "the burden upon the bar could reach
such proportions as to give the due process argument a force it does not
74 1d. at 765.75 Id.75Id.
7 Bedford v. Salt Lake County, 22 Utah 2d 12, 447 P.2d 193 (1968), In re Nine
Applications for Appointment of Counsel in Title VII Proceedings, 475 F. Supp.
87 (N.D. Ala. 1979).
71 For example, Rosenfeld points to several decisions which, although they do
not deal with the issue of attorney's services, can be analogized to the mandatory
pro bono situation. Rosenfeld, supra note 6, at 290-94.
79In Cunningham v. Superior Court, 177 Cal. App. 3d 336, 222 Cal. Rptr. 854(1986), the court stated:
It is a legitimate state function to assist the poor, but under the Constitution,
this goal cannot be accomplished at the expense of one particular group of
people. It is a denial of equal protection when the government seeks to
charge the cost of operation of a state function, conducted for the benefit of
the public, to a particular class of persons.
177 Cal. App. 3d at 348, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 861-62 (citation omitted). But see State
v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441 (1966) (denying that there is a violation of
equal protection when attorneys are asked to represent the poor without com-
pensation).
46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441 (1966).
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now have."81 Thus, there may be a limit beyond which the courts will not
allow the practice to go unchecked.82
C. Group Efforts to Develop a Pro Bono Service Requirement
Notwithstanding the confusion surrounding the correctness and ap-
propriateness of a pro bono service requirement, bar association efforts
to involve attorneys with pro bono activities have occurred on both a
national and local level. Here again, because of the lack of consensus and
the absence of a strong unified policy, the efforts have sent a mixed
message and thus have met with varying degrees of success.
1. American Bar Association Efforts
Efforts to involve the private bar on a nationwide basis with public
service work can be traced to the Canons of Professional Ethics which
were adopted by the American Bar Association in 1908.83 The Canons
articulated that every lawyer had an ethical duty to accept assignment
as counsel for an indigent prisoner and to forego a fee where appropriate;8
however, they made no reference to the frequency with which such as-
signments should be accepted. These Canons were expanded with the
adoption of the Code of Professional Responsibility in August, 1969. The
Code, eventually adopted by forty-eight states, 5 included the Canons,
Id. at 408, 217 A.2d at 446.
82 See also Partain v. Oakley, 159 W.Va. 805, 227 S.E.2d 314 (1976), which held
that
where the caseload of appointments is so large as to occupy a substantial
amount of the attorney's time and thus substantially impairs his ability to
engage in the remunerative practice of law, or where the attorney's costs
and out-of-pocket expenses attributable to representing indigent persons
charged with crime reduce the attorney's net income from private practice
to a substantial and deleterious degree, the requirements must be consid-
ered confiscatory and unconstitutional.
Id. at 814, 227 S.E.2d 319. The court further stated that the "present system of
appointment is rapidly approaching an unacceptable and potentially unconsti-
tutional state." Id. It therefore ordered that lawyers "may no longer be required
to accept appointments as in the past" and gave the Legislature one year in which
to define the specifics of a delivery system for legal defense counsel. Id. at 822,
227 S.E.2d at 323.
ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1908).
"A lawyer assigned as counsel for an indigent prisoner ought not to ask to
be excused for any trivial reason, and should always exert his best efforts in his
behalf." Id. Canon 4. Canon 12 states in pertinent part that "[a]
to pay cannot justify a charge in excess of the value of the service, though his
poverty may require a less charge, or even none at all." Id. Canon 12.
G. HAzARD, JR. & D. RHODE, THE LEGAL PROFESSION: RESPONSIBILITY AND
REGULATION 100 (2d ed. 1988). Two states, California and Illinois, did not adopt
the Code of Professional Responsibility; however, they did pass similar rules or
a modified version, respectively. Id.
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representing the general standards of professional conduct, Ethical Con-
siderations, which are aspirational in nature, and Disciplinary Rules,
which are mandatory and which, once adopted by a state legislature or
court, subjected an attorney to disciplinary sanctions for infraction.86 The
1969 Code asked attorneys to go beyond representing only the indigent
prisoner. It broadened the lawyer's responsibilities by requesting that s/
he assist the legal profession generally in fulfilling its duty to make legal
counsel available regardless of the client's ability to pay. 7
The ABA continued its activities to promote a pro bono service require-
ment and in 1975 the ABA House of Delegates approved a resolution
which affirmed each attorney's responsibility to provide public interest
legal services, defined those services broadly to include poverty law, civil
rights law, public rights law, charitable organization representation and
the administration ofjustice, and placed responsibility with the organized
bar to assist each lawyer in fulfilling that responsibility. 8  This latter
requirement gave impetus to the bar's further involvement in defining
the lawyers' pro bono publico commitment.
It was with these attempts to further define the pro bono responsibility
that dissent in the bar first became apparent. In 1979, the American Bar
Association Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards re-
leased the first draft of its proposed revisions of the Code of Professional
- MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preliminary Statement(1969).
17 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBLrrY (1969). It states: "A lawyer
should assist the legal profession in fulfilling its duty to make legal counsel
available." Id. Canon 2. Ethical Consideration (EC) 2-16 states that "persons
unable to pay all or a portion of a reasonable fee should be able to obtain necessary
legal services, and lawyers should support and participate in ethical activities
designed to achieve that objective." Id. EC 2-16. "The basic responsibility for
providing legal services for those unable to pay ultimately rests upon the indi-
vidual lawyer." Id. EC 2-25. "The fair administration ofjustice requires the avail-
ability of competent lawyers .... Those persons unable to pay for legal services
should be provided needed services." Id. EC 8-3.
s The text of the full resolution adopted by the House of Delegates in Montreal
in August 1975:
RESOLVED, That it is a basic professional responsibility of each lawyer
engaged in the practice of law to provide public interest legal services;
FURTHER RESOLVED, That public interest legal service is legal service
provided without fee or at a substantially reduced fee, which falls into one
or more of the following areas:
1. Poverty Law: Legal services in civil and criminal matters of importance
to a client who does not have the financial resources to compensate
counsel.
2. Civil Rights Law: Legal representation involving a right of an indi-
vidual which society has a special interest in protecting.
3. Public Rights Law: Legal representation involving an important right
belonging to a significant segment of the public.
4. Charitable Organization Representation: Legal service to charitable,
religious, civic, governmental and educational institutions in matters
in furtherance of their organizational purpose, where the payment of
customary legal fees would significantly deplete the organization's
economic resources or would be otherwise inappropriate.
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Responsibility. 9 Unlike the Code, which consisted of Canons, Ethical
Considerations and Disciplinary Rules, the revisions consisted solely of
Rules of Professional Conduct to be enforced through disciplinary pro-
ceedings. This early draft, which was given limited circulation, proposed
a pro bono service requirement of forty hours per year or the financial
equivalent." Disagreement as to the requirement caused the Commission
to issue a revised draft in 1980 which eliminated both the specification
of hours and the financial alternative, made the requirement one of serv-
ice only, and required attorneys to report their compliance on an annual
basis.9 1
As a result of the inability to reach a consensus, the Commission in
late 1980 returned to the 1969 Code approach making the service re-
quirement purely aspirational in character. Both the mandatory nature
of the requirement and the suggestion for annual reporting were omit-
ted.92 In fact, opposition to a mandatory pro bono standard was so strong
that the adoption of the entire set of rules proposed by the Kutak Com-
mission was threatened. 93 The ABA's Model Rules of Professional Con-
5. Administration of Justice: Activity, whether under bar association
auspices, or otherwise, which is designed to increase the availability
of legal services, or otherwise improve the administration of justice.
FURTHER RESOLVED, That public interest legal services shall at all
times be provided in a manner consistent with the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Code of Judicial Conduct;
FURTHER RESOLVED, That so long as there is a need for public interest
legal services, it is incumbent upon the organized bar to assist each lawyer
in fulfilling his professional responsibility to provide such services as well
as to assist, foster and encourage governmental, charitable and other
sources to provide public interest legal services.
FURTHER RESOLVED, That the appropriate officials, committees or
sections of the American Bar Association are instructed to proceed with the
development of proposals to carry out the interest and purpose of the fore-
going resolutions.
ABA House of Delegates Res. on Public Interest Legal Services (Aug. 1975) re-
printed in Rosenfeld, supra note 6, at 260 n.29.
" The commission was also known as the Kutak Commission after Robert J.
Kutak, chairman of the commission. See Rhode, Why The ABA Bothers: A Func-
tional Perspective on Professional Codes, 59 TEx. L. REV. 689 (1981).
00 Shapiro, supra note 1, at 736 n.5.
9' MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.1 (Discussion Draft January
1980)
A Lawyer shall render unpaid public interest legal service. A lawyer may
discharge this responsibility by service in activities for improving the law,
the legal system, or the legal profession, or by providing professional serv-
ices to persons of limited means or to public service groups or organizations.
A lawyer shall make an annual report concerning such service to appro-
priate regulatory authority.
Id. (emphasis added).
92 As adopted by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association on
August 17, 1983 Model Rule 6.1 states in pertinent part only that "[a] lawyer
should render public interest legal service." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT Rule 6.1 (1983) (emphasis added).
'
3Smith, A Mandatory Pro Bono Service Standard - Its Time Has Come, 35 U.
MIAmI L. REV. 727, 728 (1981).
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duct, promulgated in 1983 without any mandatory pro bono, are now in
effect in about half of the states.94
More recent efforts by the American Bar Association, however, have
at least resulted in the endorsement by the House of Delegates of a
recommended pro bono service commitment that each attorney should
strive to give annually. Specifically, the ABA House of Delegates, in
August, 1988, passed a resolution, without opposition,95 calling for all
attorneys to devote fifty hours per year to pro bono and other public service
activities that serve those in need, improve the law, the legal system or
the legal profession. 96 Furthermore, the resolution provided that law firms
and corporate employers should credit attorneys with time they spend on
pro bono work toward their billable hours requirements, and that law
schools should require firms recruiting on campus to provide a copy of
their pro bono policy.9
7
2. Efforts of State and Local Bar Associations and Courts
The inability of the national bar to show a unified front in supporting
a pro bono standard inevitably transferred the problem of providing coun-
sel for the poor to the state and local bar associations and courts. Con-
troversy at this level has continued and thus has hindered the establish-
ment of efficient systems to involve individual attorneys in pro bono work.
Nevertheless, a few local bar associations and courts have been able to
implement pro bono standards.
For example, there are several voluntary bar associations which have
made pro bono mandatory with membership. The Orange County Bar
Association of Florida, a voluntary bar association, requires all members
to become involved with public service activity.9 Attorneys either take
two pro bono referrals each year or make an annual financial contribution
of $250. 99 However, although the pro bono requirement is mandatory,
there is no enforcement mechanism; therefore, some attorneys, albeit a
small percentage (approximately 3%), refuse to take case referrals or to
pay dues.100 Other bar associations with a mandatory pro bono require-
G. HAZARD, JR. & D. RHODE, supra note 85, at 100.
95 Marcotte, Pro Bono Policy Passed, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1, 1988, at 140.
Id. See also, J. TYRRELL, THE LAW FiRM PRO BONO MANUAL i (1989).
97 Marcotte, supra note 95, at 140.
"I Marin-Rosa & Stepter, Orange County - Mandatory Pro Bono in a Voluntary
Bar Association, FLA. B. J., Dec. 1985, at 21.
99 1d.
100 As of October, 1987 the Orange County Bar Association reports that of the
1600 members of the bar, 50 refuse to take case referrals or pay dues as required.
Reported by the American Bar Association Private Bar Involvement Project
(PBIP) as an addendum to the article referenced in note 98. The PBIP has compiled
an information packet on civil mandatory pro bono which may be requested by
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ment include the DuPage County Bar Association, Illinois; Eau Claire
County Bar Association, Wisconsin; in Florida, the Tallahassee Bar As-
sociation, and the Leon and Palm Beach County Bar Associations; and
in Texas, the Bryan and Athens County Bar Associations.1
0
'
Courts have also become involved in the attempt to require attorneys
to provide legal services to the poor either by local rules or general orders,
which provide for mandatory appointment of free counsel for an indigent
in civil cases. District Courts in eight federal jurisdictions - Eastern and
Western Districts of Arkansas, Northern and Central Districts of Illinois,
Northern and Southern Districts of Iowa, District of Connecticut, and the
San Antonio division of Texas' Western District - have adopted such
rules. 0 2 However, although some bar associations and courts have
adopted a pro bono policy and standards, many more are still debating
the desirability of mandatory standards. In either case, the controversy
is sending a mixed message to attorneys. In the meantime, resources are
being kept from effectively meeting the needs of the poor either because
proponents must continue to exert time and effort in meeting critics'
attacks on existing systems or because they are funneling energies to-
wards putting mandatory pro bono policies in place.
Court-ordered appointments without compensation, for example, have
been challenged across the country. In 1983, when the Fresno, California
County Superior Court took steps to compel pro bono representation of
indigents in paternity and child support cases, critics of the plan stood
ready to take their challenge to the Supreme Court, if necessary.'
0
' The
California court eventually withdrew from its position and abandoned its
plans for compelling pro bono representation. 0 4 Similar challenges to
court appointed pro bono representation have occurred in Arkansas, New
York, and most recently in Iowa."'
101 Graham, Mandatory Pro Bono - The Shape of Things To Come?, A.B.A. J.,
Dec. 1, 1987, at 62. However, not all associations allow a financial alternative.
For example, in contrast to the Orange County Bar in Florida, the Tallahassee
Bar Association has rejected a financial alternative and requires attorneys' serv-
ices alone. Smith, supra note 93, at 731.
102 Graham, supra note 101, at 62.
10 Id. at 64.
104 Id.
105 In Arkansas, Joseph M. Erwin, a sole practitioner, requested that he be
excused from his assigned case and charged that the court order violated federal
rules of civil procedure requiring notice and comment as well as equal protection
guarantees. Miskiewicz, Volunteerism Alone Not Enough - Mandatory Pro Bono
Won't Disappear, Nat'l L. J., Mar. 23, 1987, at 1, col. 1. No further action was
taken by Erwin after the court remedied the procedural defects and rescinded
the order affecting him, but he is quoted as saying that other attorneys are ready
to pick up where he left off. Graham, supra note 101, at 64. See In re Farrell, 127
Misc. 2d 350, 486 N.Y.S.2d 130 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (holding that attorneys could be
compelled to represent indigent clients). See also Mallard v. United States Dist.
Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296 (1989) (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)
permits district courts to request attorneys to represent indigent litigants in civil
cases but does not permit courts to require such representation).
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Debates in bar associations abound. For example, after lengthy debate,
the Dade County Bar Association of Florida eventually rejected a proposal
for a mandatory pro bono service requirement in 1987.106 Recently the
issue has been hotly debated in New York. Since early 1988, when New
York State Chief Judge Sol Wachtler first appointed the Committee to
Improve the Availability of Legal Services (the Marrero Committee), crit-
ics and proponents of mandatory pro bono have wrestled with issues of
the indigent's need for counsel, the constitutionality of compelling attor-
neys to represent the poor without compensation, and appropriate deliv-
ery systems.10 7 The initial review by the Marrero Committee alone lasted
an entire year and ended with the submission of preliminary proposals
in the spring of 1989.108 The period of comment which followed lasted yet
another year with a final decision not expected until the first quarter of
1990, fully two years after the initial inquiry was made. 109 Other states
which have considered, or are currently considering, a mandatory pro
bono service requirement include Hawaii, North Dakota, Maryland, and
Arizona. 11o
It is important to note that bar associations and the courts are not the
only groups involved in the pro bono debate. Both the Oregon and Wash-
ington state legislatures have considered, but failed to pass, proposals
which would have made service to the poor by attorneys a requirement
to practice in the state."'
D. International Developments
American treatment of the problem of providing legal representation
for the indigent, and its corresponding dependence on pro bono activity,
is in distinct contrast to the development of solutions to the problem in
the remainder of most of the western world. Although many western
European nations have in the past relied on charitable work by attorneys
to represent poor clients, the concept of charity has slowly been abandoned
in favor of comprehensive, government-financed programs to meet the
need. 112
For example, although proponents of a mandatory pro bono system
point to the English tradition, which as mentioned previously is in itself
somewhat questionable, 13 they fail to recognize that England abandoned
106Graham, supra note 101, at 62.
07 COMMITTEE TO IMPROVE THE AVAILABILITY OF LEGAL SERVICES, PRELIMINARY
REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, 1 (July 18, 1989).
108 Id.
109 Spencer, State Bar Opposes Mandatory Pro Bono - Governing Body Endorses
Additional Funds, Increased Voluntary Efforts by Lawyers, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 31, 1989,
at 1, col. 5.
"10 PBIP Fact Sheet Summary, Mandatory Pro Bono. See supra note 100.11, Graham, supra note 101, at 62. The Oregon proposal would have required
both attorneys and physicians with at least five years experience to provide 200hours of professional services in criminal cases every six years at no cost toindigent persons in need. H.R., 2005, 64th Leg., 1987 Or.
'
12 M. CAPPELLETTI, J. GORDLEY & E. JOHNSON, TOwARD EQUAL JUSTICE: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL AID IN MODERN SOCIETIES 53 (1975).113 See supra notes 1-7 and corresponding text.
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the practice of compelling attorneys to take on pro bono work without fee
in the middle of the twentieth century. 14 In 1949, England passed the
Legal Aid and Advice Act, which provided full compensation from gov-
ernment funds for lawyers' services provided to a qualifying poor client.
In France, as in the United States, the right to counsel has been recognized
for some time.115 Although until 1972 there was no provision for remu-
neration of attorneys who took on indigent cases, legislation passed in
that year provided for such compensation to attorneys.
116 By contrast,
Germany, although it was later than either England or France in recog-
nizing the poor's right to counsel in civil cases, was the first to give
meaning to that right by enacting legislation, in 1923, which provided
for compensation of attorneys.
117
Northern European countries which assured a right to counsel by pro-
mulgating laws to compensate their lawyers included Norway in 1915,118
Sweden in 1919,119 Denmark in 1969,120 and Belgium"' and the Neth-
erlands in 1957.122 Government supported programs also exist in countries
in southern and central Europe. Spain has guaranteed a right to counsel
since 1855, and since 1975 has provided compensation for lawyers rep-
resenting the indigent. 23 Although Austria does not provide direct com-
pensation to lawyers for representing poor clients, the government does
make payments to a bar association pension fund to compensate for the
services.124 Only Italy and Portugal continue a system of requiring char-
itable services of attorneys to meet the needs of the indigent for counsel.
125
Indeed, a substantial number of other nations in the western world have
114 M. CAPPELLETTI, J. GORDLEY & E. JOHNSON, supra note 112, at 53.
115 Johnson, The Right to Counsel in Civil Cases: An International Perspective,
19 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 341, 343 (1985). In 1851 the French legislature enacted the
Law on Legal Aid, which established that free lawyers should be provided for
civil litigants with insufficient resources. Id.
11 Id. The Law of Jan. 3, 1972, No.72-11, J.O. (Jan. 5, 1972) provided for
government payment of lawyers representing the indigent. Id. at 343 n.10.
117 The right to counsel in civil cases in Germany was created in 1877. In 1919
an amendment to the law first provided that attorneys be compensated for their
actual disbursements, while later amendments in 1923 provided that they be
compensated for their fees as well. M. CAPPELLETTI, J. GORDLEY & E. JOHNSON,
supra note 112, at 48 n.148.
Johnson, supra note 115, at 344.
1'Id.
120 Id. at 344-45. In Denmark, the right to counsel compensated by the state
is made available to the middle class as well as the poor. Id. at 345 n.15.
121 Id. at 345.
122 Johnson, The Right to Counsel in Civil Cases: An International Perspective,
19 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 341, 345 (1985).
122 Id. at 346 & n.20.
124 Id. at 346 & n.19.
125 Id. at 346 nn.21, 23.
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followed suit and not only guarantee the indigent a right to counsel, but
also make provision for that right by guaranteeing that counsel be com-
pensated by the government for services rendered. 12 6
III. THE PROBLEM OF UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS
Although there is disagreement as to the gravity and scope of the unmet
legal needs of the poor, 127 no one denies that the needs of the indigent
are not being fully satisfied by the current legal system.
A. The Legal Needs of the Indigent
Several recent studies have detailed both quantitatively and qualita-
tively the specific legal needs of the poor. On a national basis, it is esti-
mated that the poor have approximately twenty million legal problems,
93.2% of which go unserved .1 2 Although this is in itself a staggering
figure, several studies have gone further in defining the need by individ-
ual household, thus making the figures even more meaningful. Nine
surveys done by various groups throughout the nation estimated that a
poor household is faced with at least one to as many as six legal problems
annually. 129 On an even more personal level, this suggests that individ-
uals encounter, on average, from one to two legal problems each year,
and, as indicated above, most are not satisfied."'0
Legal needs in the civil area which go unmet range in variety from
126 During the 1960's and 1970's New Zealand, most of the Australian states,
and most Canadian provinces enacted legislation to assure that the poor were
provided with compensated attorneys. Id. at 347-348.
127 See COMMITTEE TO IMPROVE THE AVAILABILITY OF LEGAL SERVICES, supra
note 107, at 69 (statement by Sol Neil Corbin disagreeing with the Committee
that empirical evidence supported their conclusion that a "crisis" exists).
128 Born, Serving the Poor, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1, 1988, at 144. Specifically, the
study identified 19,792,000 legal problems.
129 CIVIL LEGAL SERVICES COMMITTEE OF THE STATE BAR ASsoCIATION OF NORTH
DAKOTA AND THE NORTH DAKOTA TRIAL LAwYERs' ASSOCIATION AND THE NORTH
DAKOTA SUPREME COURT, A WORKABLE PLAN FOR CIVIL LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE
POOR OF NORTH DAKOTA: A PRACTICAL, EQUITABLE AND POLITICAL PROPOSAL FOR
BAR LEADERSHIP app. 6 (Feb. 19, 1988). The National Studies of the Incidence of
Civil Legal Problems of Poor Persons (1975-1986) indicated an annual incidence
of legal problems per poor household ranging from 1.14 to 5.5. Id.
13Id. Specifically, the studies found that individuals encounter between .49 to
2.35 legal problems annually. Conversion from incidence of civil legal problems
per household to incidence of civil legal problems per poor person is accomplished
using 2.34 persons per household. Id. Following is only a summary of the survey
results. More specific detail as to survey population and method of survey is
available in the cited appendix.
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housing to immigration problems.131 Although securing and maintaining
decent housing is generally the most common and most serious of the
problems faced by the indigent, this is followed closely by problems the
poor have in securing public benefits, consumer problems (such as con-
sumer fraud and debt collection problems), health problems, problems
encountered with utilities, family disputes, and discrimination.
1 3 2 Unless
legal counsel is made available, the indigent will be ill-equipped to face
such complex and devastating problems as wrongful eviction, arbitrary
and inadequate benefits distribution, and denial of health care.
National Studies
of the Incidence of Civil Legal Problems
of Poor Persons (1975-1986)
Sample Per Per
Study Date Location Size Household Person
Boston Bar Boston,
Association 1975 Mass. 500 1.14 .49
Nat'l Soc. Jacksonville,
Science & Law 1979 Florida 151 2.87 1.20
North Carolina
Legal Services 1979 N.C. 434 1.80 .77
Virginia Legal South Central
Aid Society 1979 Virginia 687 2.50 1.07
Western Ken- 24 Kentucky
tucky Legal 1980 Counties 295 1.30 .56
Nat'l Soc. Providence,
Science & Law 1980 Rhode Island 150 3.95 1.70
North. Va. Northern Va.
Legal Services 1982 counties 1,353 5.50 2.35
North Central Texas 5 North Central
Legal Services 1983 Texas counties 149 3.05 1.30
Legal Aid Foundation
of Colorado 1986 Colorado 500 3.72 1.70
131 The draft of The New York Legal Needs Study, reprinted in Appendix 4 of
the NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO
REVIEW THE PROPOSED PLAN FOR MANDATORY PRO BONO SERVICE (Oct. 16, 1989).
(The draft was being finalized while the Bar Association Report was being
written).
132 Id. Specifics of the study include the following data:
Housing - over 34% of those surveyed reported having at least one such legal
problem and nearly 36% of those who had a housing problem labelled it as their
most serious legal problem.
Public benefits - 22% of the respondents reported having at least one such problem.
13.7% of the respondents identified it as their most serious.
Consumer problems - 15.4% of those surveyed indicated at least one unmet legal
need in this area, and 7% of these respondents said it was their most serious
problem.
Health - 15% had at least one unmet health related legal need, while 11.8% said
it was their most serious problem.
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B. Methods for Meeting the Need
Although various methods of meeting the poor's need for legal repre-
sentation have been advanced, they have failed to adequately satisfy the
growing need.113 Current forms of providing counsel for the indigent in-
clude both private and government funding of legal aid, storefront law
offices or legal clinics, prepaid legal insurance, contingent or reduced fee
legal services and, of course, pro bono activities on the part of the orga-
nized bar and individual attorneys. One trend is evident. While attorney
and bar association involvement in the pro bono solution seems to be
garnering more attention, 134 government support is definitely on the de-
cline. For example, beginning in 1984 the Reagan administration pro-
posed that the Legal Services Corporation, a primary source of funding
for state and local agencies providing legal representation to the poor,
not be reauthorized and that no funding be provided to it.1 5
As the discussion in the above section indicates, pro bono activities are
currently receiving much publicity as a means of providing the poor with
needed legal services.1 3 8 The attention pro bono has been receiving has
no doubt increased awareness and prompted some lawyers to donate their
time.137 But the response is still inadequate to meet the need.
United States government involvement in finding a solution to the
poor's need for counsel has a long and controversial history. The Economic
Opportunity Act of 1964, which created the Office of Economic Oppor-
tunity (OEO), and within it the Community Action Program (CAP), pro-
vided the first move toward federal funding of legal services for the
indigent. 181 In the following year, the Legal Services Program (LSP) was
13 Of the nearly 20 million legal problems the poor encounter annually, 6.1%
are dealt with by Legal Services Corporation attorneys, while only 0.7% are met
by private bar response. Born, supra note 128, at 144.
134 Between 1981 and 1987 the number of pro bono programs throughout the
country rose from 50 to 450. They operate in all 50 states as well as Washington,
D.C. and Puerto Rico. Miskiewicz, supra note 105, at 1, col. 1.
-
3 5 EXCIYVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 5-141 (FY 1984).38 The ABA Private Bar Involvement Project estimates approximately 88,000
attorneys were involved in rendering legal aid to the poor in 1986, while by 1988
the number had reached 100,000. Miskiewicz, supra note 105, at 1, col. 1; Man-
datory Pro Bono, A.B.A. J., May 1, 1988, at 46. Also, fully 95% of today's pro bono
programs did not exist before 1982. Id. at 47.
137 In 1985 the ABA estimated that 10.7% of licensed attorneys in the United
States participated in formal pro bono programs. However, by 1987 the figure
had increased to 13.8%. ABA CONSORTIUM ON LEGAL SERVICES AND THE PUBLIC
THROUGH THE PRIVATE BAR INVOLVEMENT PROJECT, DIRECTORY OF PRIVATE BAR
INVOLVEMENT PROGRAMS, 199, 212 (1987).
138 Special Project: The Legal Services Corporation: Past, Present, and Future?,
28 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV., 593, 597 (1983) (citing Pub. L. No. 88-452, Title II, § 201,
78 Stat. 508 (1964) codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2781 (1976)).
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established as a part of the CAP, which was made responsible for ad-
ministering the program 13 9 By 1967, the LSP's budget was at $40 mil-
lion.140
From the beginning, however, the Legal Services Program was not
without opposition. Federal, state and local government bodies, as well
as some private interest groups felt threatened by the litigation that the
LSP was pursuing. For example, the California Rural Legal Assistance
(CRLA), an OEO organization, sponsored several politically volatile suits
which aroused so much hostility and so galvanized critics that the exis-
tence of the entire LSP was actually threatened.
141
As political attacks against the LSP mounted, 14 2 supporters of providing
legal services for the poor urged that the LSP cut itself off from the OEO
and organize as a separate corporation, but still remain dependent on
federal funding. In 1974, the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) was es-
tablished as a "private nonmembership nonprofit corporation... for the
purpose of providing financial support for legal assistance in noncriminal
proceedings or matters to persons financially unable to afford legal as-
sistance.."'
43
Even as a separate corporation, however, the LSC has been subject to
the political and economic realities of government funding. Between 1975
and 1980, the LSC budget appropriation rose at first from $71 million to
$300 million.144 Increases in funding allowed the LSC to reach its short
term goal of providing the equivalent of two attorneys for every 10,000
poor people. 145 However, in 1981, the Reagan administration announced
that it proposed to eliminate the LSC and consequently made no allotment
for funds in its proposed fiscal year budget for 1982.14
139 George, Development of the Legal Services Corporation, 61 CORNELL L. REV.
681, 687 (1976) (citing Pub. L. No. 89-253, § 12, 79 Stat. 973-74).
140 Special Project: The Legal Services Corporation: Past, Present, and Future?,
supra note 138, at 598 (citing ABA, LAWYERS AND THE POOR: A REPORT ON THE
LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM OF THE OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 71, 99
(1965)).
141 For example, Morris v. Williams, 67 Cal. 2d 733, 433 P.2d 697, 63 Cal. Rptr.
689 (1967), a CRLA sponsored case, forced California to restore $210 million in
cutbacks made in the state's Medi-Cal Program. The litigation had important
political consequences for both CRLA and the LSP, and possibly the later created
Legal Services Corporation because it kept Governor Reagan from fulfilling a
campaign promise to balance the state budget. George, supra note 139, at 683-
87.
42In 1973, Howard Phillips, appointed by President Nixon as acting OEO
Director, began issuing directives which were aimed at disbanding the OEO anti-
poverty programs, including the LSP. Because President Nixon never submitted
his name to the Senate for confirmation, many of the actions Phillips took as
acting director were deemed void. Special Project: The Legal Services Corporation:
Past, Present, and Future?, supra note 138, at 593, 602 n.97.
14342 U.S.C. § 2996b(a) (1982).
1"Special Project: The Legal Services Corporation: Past, Present, and Future?,
supra note 138, at 609.
1451d.
1" Id. at 610-11.
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Since then, the LSC has been plagued by the inability to increase its
funding. While the national expenditure on services for lawyers in civil
cases is at approximately $60 billion annually,' 7 the LSC's budget re-
mains frozen at approximately $300 million per year. 148 In other words,
less than one half of one percent of attorneys' fees is spent on represen-
tation for the indigent, who make up approximately ten percent of the
population. 149 The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings budget reduction act of 1986
caused a further reduction of $14.3 million in federal funding.150 By 1987
it was estimated that the lack of funding had caused further deterioration
to the extent that there existed only 1.6 attorneys for every 10,000 persons
below the poverty level. 1' Correspondingly, the number of lawyers em-
ployed by the Legal Services Corporation fell from 6,500 in 1980 to 4,500
in 1987,152 while those in poverty rose from 6.2 to 7 million people. 15
Even the government's actions with respect to their support of funding
for indigent access to legal services send a confusing message to those
who must eventually provide the service. The following comments from
a brief written in support of increased funding imply that the evisceration
of the LSC due to lack of funding could
quite possibly have the effect of dampening the private bar's
commitment to pro bono services. Such a step would be seen,
and not incorrectly, as a national decision that legal services
for the poor are not all that important, or merely reflect "lib-
eral" political tenets no longer in vogue. If the taxpayers and
their elected representatives belittle the importance of provid-
ing legal services for the poor, it would be difficult for lawyers
to view themselves as duty bound to contribute their own time
and services toward this goal. 5 4
147 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES 751 (Table No. 1322) (1989). For example, figures for Gross
National Product in legal services between the years 1980 and 1987 are as follows:
1980 - $23.3, 1981 - $25.9, 1982 - $30.6, 1983 - $35.0, 1984 - $41.6, 1985 - $46.3,
1986 - $53.7, 1987 - $62.3. (In billions of dollars, in current dollars). Id.
148 EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 6f-164 (FY 1989).
149BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, supra note 147, at 455
(Table No. 739). Families below poverty level between the years 1980 and 1987
are as follows: 1980 - 10.3%, 1981 - 11.2%, 1982 - 12.2%, 1983 - 12.4%, 1984 -
11.6%, 1985 - 11.4%, 1986 - 10.9%, 1987 - 10.8%. Id.
1- Miskiewicz, supra note 105, at 8, col. 3.
151 Id.
1 2 Poor Have a Right to Their Day in Court, USA Today, Jan. 14, 1988, at 8A,
col. 1.
153 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, supra note 147, at 455
(Table No. 739).
' Special Project: The Legal Services Corporation: Past, Present, and Future?,
supra note 138, at 641-42.
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IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR A WORKABLE PROGRAM
Given the desperate need for legal representation, a solution must be
found. The legal profession can be a part of that solution on many different
fronts: by bringing about legislation to better fund legal aid programs,
by encouraging private fund raising efforts to fill the need, and by en-
couraging pro bono work. What is needed is a comprehensive action plan
which will integrate and effect continuous supervision and management
of all possible facets of such a program. The following are the suggested
components for achieving such an integrated plan.
A. Government Funding
Seeking increased government commitment to what is in effect a social
welfare problem, is essential if the poor are to be assured of adequate
legal assistance. Programs suggested by groups researching the problem
often include increased government funding, but few offer a constructive
plan to make that happen.156 One group which has gone beyond merely
recognizing that government funding should be increased has suggested
that the bar should take the responsibility of educating the media, the
public, and government leaders about the extent and nature of unmet
needs of the poor so that their support for increased funding may be
elicited. 15
6
In addition to educating individuals about the needs of the poor, it will
also be critical to dispel any skepticism that might surround a plan pro-
posed by the bar to increase funding for legal services, i.e., to dispel the
view that the proposal was just another means for lawyers to make more
money. Therefore, the education should also emphasize lawyers' contri-
butions, such as their private fund-raising efforts and pro bono work.
The education of the public, media, and legislators will also be necessary
to overcome doubts that a government program can efficiently achieve
the goal of bringing legal services to the poor. Even proponents of a
mandatory pro bono service requirement recognize that a "better solution
would be a quick, large infusion of federal, state, and municipal funds to
provide civil legal services equal to the demand.."
157
In order for the general public to recognize that government funding
is the best answer to providing legal services to the poor, it will be im-
portant for those lobbying for increased funding to point to the positive
151 For example, the Marrero Report merely "recommends increased public
spending" at all levels of government but does not contemplate how this is to be
achieved. COMMITTEE TO IMPROVE THE AVAILABILITY OF LEGAL SERVICES, supra
note 107, at 9.
15 NEW YORK STATE BAR AssoCIATION, supra note 131, at 14.
151 COMMITTEE TO IMPROVE THE AVAILABILITY OF LEGAL SERVICES, supra note
107, at 20.
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results of state and federally funded programs designed to bring services
to the poor at a minimum of cost. For example, the Legal Services Cor-
poration spends approximately ninety-five percent of its budgeted dollars
directly on aiding the poor, while only five percent is spent for manage-
ment and administration of the organization.158 Also, state support for
legal aid can be shown to benefit not only the client, but also indirectly,
the state treasury. Several programs in New York designed to fund at-
torney fees in child support, AIDS, and housing proceedings have actually
succeeded in saving the state tax dollars by exacting payment for services
from the responsible parties and thus relieving the government of pro-
viding support in the form of ADC, Medicaid, or state supported hous-
ing.159
In addition to pointing out the reasonable cost involved in federal and
state funding of legal services, the greater efficiency of government staff
attorneys versus a pro bono system of attorneys should be emphasized.
A government staff attorney concentrating exclusively on the problems
of the poor will develop an effectiveness in dealing with cases which the
private bar, even through additional training, is unlikely to achieve. Some
areas of poverty law, such as needs-based government benefit programs,
can involve complex statutes, regulations and administrative and bu-
reaucratic processes. No doubt these could be deciphered by a volunteer
attorney with time spent researching the problem, but often the time
available is minimal since the needs of the poor often arise in emergency
situations where time is of the essence.1 60 In addition, by immersing
themselves in one area of law, staff attorneys will be better able than
volunteers to recognize systemic and recurring problems and thus respond
with appropriate solutions.161
Of course, government funded legal services programs offer no pana-
ceas. The government staff attorney is typically young and inexperienced
and therefore less capable of protecting his/her clients against such bu-
'
T In 1979, the LSC reported that it spent only 2.4% of its total legal services
budget for management and administration costs, while 94.3% was spent on fieldprograms to provide legal aid, with the remainder going to program support and
field monitoring. Special Project: The Legal Services Corporation: Past, Present,
and Future?, supra note 138, at 615 (citing LSC ANN. REP. 28 (1979)).
" The New York child support project pursues cases where the failure to
receive child support has forced or may force the custodial parent to rely ongovernment aid. Thus by exacting support from the responsible parent, the project
saves government funds such as ADC from being used.
The New York State Department of Health AIDS project helps to transfer the
cost of supporting AIDS patients from the state by enforcing private insurance
contracts and thus delaying or avoiding reliance on the state's funds.
The homelessness prevention project funded by the State Department of SocialServices aids clients in housing proceedings in order to check homelessness before
it starts, and its consequential costs to the state. NEW YORK STATE BAR Asso-
CIATION, supra note 131, at 19.
1"Id. at 15.
161 Id. at 17.
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reaucratic imperatives as the pressure to settle. 16 2 In addition, heavy case
loads and a high turnover rate among legal aid attorneys result in very
little training or supervision to support and develop the inexperienced
attorney. 10 On balance, though, legal services attorneys provide a valu-
able service.
Finally, in order to place responsibility for providing legal services for
the indigent firmly in the hands of the government, it will be necessary
for the bar to rally support for the idea that lack of such legal services
will have the ultimate effect of undermining the legal system. The public
must be made to understand that
[r]espect for the legal system is a two-way street. A citizen's
respect for the system necessarily requires a perception that
the system is fair, and essential to that perception is that the
citizen enjoy effective access to it. If the public does not afford
the poor such access, it can hardly expect the poor to respect
the legal system .... Affording all persons, regardless of their
means, access to legal services is an essential element of our
social compact as a society of laws. 164
B. Contributions by Attorneys and Law Firms
Both financial and service contributions by individual attorneys and
law firms should be encouraged by the bar as a factor in alleviating the
poor's need for legal services. In light of the uncertain legal status of
mandatory pro bono plans, it seems that a better strategy would be for
opponents and proponents of a mandatory plan to set aside their disa-
greements, and unite to produce a voluntary plan which would truly make
a difference in making legal services accessible to the poor.
A recent example of such a strategy is the program initiated in Mary-
land in the fall of 1989.165 Although they came close to endorsing man-
datory pro bono, the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure instead recommended that the Maryland Court of Appeals
,62 Bellow, Turning Solutions into Problems: The Legal Aid Experience, in THE
LEGAL PROFESSION: RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION 430-31 (2d ed. 1988).
' ' Id. at 431-32.
See Special Project: The Legal Services Corporation: Past, Present, and Fu-
ture?, supra note 138, at 635.
"I Marcotte, Pro Bono Recruits, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1990, at 25. The campaign is
directed at increasing public and private funding for legal services programs and
expanding pro bono work. One Hundred Sixth Report of the Standing Committee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Court of Appeals of Maryland (Dec. 22, 1988).
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allow the Maryland State Bar Association to mount a statewide campaign
to increase voluntary pro bono.166 The plan, which includes a mass mailing
to all Maryland attorneys, glitzy celebrity advertising, and heavy media
exposure, was expected to recruit about one half of the state's attorneys
for pro bono work. 67 The mailing, which corresponded with "People's Pro
Bono Week" was so well received that, within two months, over fifty
percent of attorneys had already responded to the survey and ninety
percent of those responding had indicated a willingness to volunteer for
pro bono service. 68
1. Pro Bono
Because attorneys and law firms are uniquely qualified to render legal
assistance, their commitment to pro bono work is an essential ingredient
in giving the poor better access to the legal system. In order to evoke the
greatest response, the bar must take two basic steps. First, it must em-
phasize that pro bono work is an obligation to be taken seriously, and
though not legally compelled, is to be expected of every attorney and thus
supported by law firms. Second, the bar must assure that once an attorney
has shown a willingness to take on the obligation, the ensuing process
must be kept as simple as possible and facilitate that willingness to serve.
The ABA has already taken an important step by endorsing a fifty hour
per year standard for broadly defined pro bono service. 69 It seems that
the broader the definition, the more likely it is that attorneys will be able
to find themselves a niche in which to volunteer their services, but it is
also less likely that their services will always or even primarily be aimed
at delivering services to those in greatest need, the poor. Recognizing this
fact, it seems that the standard endorsed by the bar should be twofold.
Namely, one standard should be established for services donated exclu-
sively to meeting the urgent needs of the indigent, while another standard
should be set for volunteer services in other areas such as for nonprofit
organizations, which also depend on donated time. For example, a lawyer
could be said to have met the obligation of pro bono work, if s/he spent
- Garten, Maryland People's Pro Bono Campaign Seeks to Establish Justice
for All, PBI EXCHANGE, Winter 1990, at 10. The recommendation that pro bono
become mandatory is thus deferred for another two years while the MSBA spon-
sors the campaign and evaluates the results. Id. at 10, 18.
16 Id. at 25. "L.A. Law's" Richard Dysart was featured in the 30-second public
service ad designed to recruit attorneys for pro bono work. Id.
- Surveys were mailed to the 19,000 attorneys authorized to practice in Mary-
land during the week of October 16-22, 1990. By December 19, 1990, surveys had
already been received from 8186 lawyers. Id. at 18-20. Also, more than 5000 of
those responding were willing to be trained in new areas in order to better ac-
commodate the need of the indigent. Maryland Lawyers Provide Millions, PBI
EXCHANGE, Winter 1990, at 20.
169 Marcotte, supra note 95, at 140, J. TYRRELL, supra note 96, at i. See supra
notes 95-97 and corresponding text.
[Vol. 38:4
28https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol38/iss4/7
THE PRO BONO DEBATE
either fifteen to thirty hours of her or his time per year helping the
indigent on cases or twenty-five to fifty hours per year donating legal
expertise in other areas such as law reform efforts, the administration of
justice, assisting charities such as United Way Services, or local cultural
organizations.
170
Aside from supporting a standard for the pro bono obligation, the or-
ganized bar also needs to assure that volunteering services can be easily
accomplished. The New York State Bar Association terms this "removal
of barriers to volunteerism.' 171 Because poverty law requires a certain
expertise, training needs to be made available to those attorneys wishing
to donate their time. Another barrier which needs to be dealt with is that
of malpractice insurance. The New York State Bar report has suggested
providing for insurance with such mechanisms as an indemnification pool
or blanket professional liability insurance to cover attorneys while work-
ing on pro bono matters.172 The third barrier to volunteerism that the
New York report identifies and suggests be eliminated through special
funding is the payment of out-of-pocket costs. 73 One incentive that should
be considered is to offer attorneys state tax credits for hours spent on pro
bono cases.
174
In addition to eliminating these external "barriers to volunteerism",
the bar needs to stress that barriers inherent in the law firm environment
also be removed. For example, pro bono hours should be credited towards
the billable hour mark which a firm requires that its attorneys meet.
75
Also, reviewing pro bono work along with other billable work during
annual evaluations of associates and rewarding pro bono work with bo-
nuses would reinforce the message that pro bono is not only accepted, but
expected. 76 Firms can be supportive of pro bono in other ways as well.
For example, they can involve attorneys by establishing separate de-
partments for community service and facilitate associate rotation through
those areas, or arrange for attorneys to work outside the firm with neigh-
170 Formulae for a combination of services donated strictly for the poor and
services donated to other eligible causes could be developed. Because cases vary
in the amount of legal assistance necessary for completion, it seems that a guide-
line setting forth hours may be more appropriate. Also, a standard using hours




'NEW YORK STATE BAR AssOCLATION, supra note 131, at 27-29 (1989).2 Id. at 30.
171 Id. at 28.
1 74 J. TYRRELL, supra note 96, at 14. Virginia's Neighborhood Assistance Act,
effective in October, 1988, provides a tax credit of up to $175,000 annually for
legal services contributions by attorneys to the identified community programs.
Attorneys may take a tax credit for 50% of their total contribution. Id. at 14, 95.
171 Id. at 13.
'" Id. One firm, Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough sets aside a portion of
the aggregate amount of yearly bonuses for those who perform pro bono services.
Id.
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borhood legal aid. 77 The latter can, in turn, benefit the law firm, by
providing the young lawyers with training not readily available in his/
her ordinary practice. Also, pro bono by attorneys can generate pro bono
by others. For example, Operation Uplift, a program being adopted by
law firms around the country, asks clients who have been represented by
an attorney, pro bono, to volunteer the same amount of hours to some
type of community service as repayment for the legal services rendered. 178
2. Monetary and Fund-Raising Contributions
Just because attorneys are uniquely qualified to fill the void of legal
services for the poor does not mean that their contribution to solving the
problem need be limited to performing those services themselves. In fact,
as the above discussion regarding government funding and the efficiency
of the LSC indicates, an attorney may prefer to contribute funds, and the
indigent may thus be better served if a specialist in poverty law is as-
signed to the case, rather than a lawyer ill-equipped to take on the case.
Promoting efficiency in the system seems to be one of the best reasons to
support a monetary alternative to the pro bono obligation.
Firms can take the lead in fund-raising and in making monetary con-
tributions to aid in expanding legal services to the poor. 79 One example,
currently being used by the New York law firm of White and Case, is to
offer a bonus to new hires if they, in return, agree to work for a public
service agency for at least one year.18°
Encouraging either pro bono work or the payment of a monetary al-
ternative, however, should not be the end of the bar's involvement. Both
on a national and local level, funds can be raised to provide legal aid by
soliciting donations from individuals and corporations."18 This solicitation
should not be confined to attorneys or law firms, since as mentioned
earlier, the problem is, or at least should be, one for which all members
of society have a responsibility. Attorneys and law firms, however, should
play the major role in implementing any fund-raising drives, whether
they take the form of mail or phone campaigns. Fund-raisers should not
overlook bequests or "memberships" as a source. 182 And of course, there
177 Huizinga, Private Attorneys, Public Commitments: The State of Law Firm
Pro Bono, PBI EXCHANGE, Fall 1989, at 4, 5.
178 Provo, An Uplifting Experience, PBI EXCHANGE, Fall 1989, at 16; Bush,
Light Up the World Around You, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1990, at 9.
- See infra note 180.
180 Money for Public Service Work: New York Firm Offers Bonus, PBI Ex-
CHANGE, Fall 1989, at 25. (The bonus of $10,000 will be given in installments
while the graduate is employed by the public agency).
,', The fund-raising suggestions which follow in the text were garnered from
an interview with John Szucs, President of the Kidney Foundation of Ohio, in
Cleveland, Ohio (Jan. 8, 1990).
1
8 2 Id. For example, the Kidney Foundation allows for a continuum of donations.
Special labels denoting various levels of giving such as "life member" or "sus-
taining member" are valuable devices to spur donations.
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are special events which, if handled properly, can not only serve to in-
crease revenues but also, by increasing publicity, gather the support of
a wider audience.' 83
C. Law School and Student Involvement
Another way in which legal services for the poor can be increased is
through law school and student involvement in pro bono, clinical pro-
grams, and fund-raising. While as many as forty percent T1 4 of incoming
students are interested in public service legal careers, only three
percent'85 pursue those careers upon graduation.16 Obviously, law schools
need to take a more active part in fostering ideas and attitudes of profes-
sional and societal responsibility in their students.'1
7
Some universities are doing just that. Tulane University, Florida State
University, the University of Pennsylvania, and Valparaiso University
have adopted mandatory pro bono plans which require that students
provide free legal services as a condition of graduation.'8 The number of
hours required range from twenty hours (nine semester hours) at Tulane
University to seventy hours at the University of Pennsylvania. 59 Also
serving to "raise the profile of pro bono" is the "Just Ask" program. 90
Originating in California, the program systematically, by letter-writing
campaigns and information sharing, encourages both students and law
firms to discuss pro bono opportunities during the interview process.'9 '
'
83Id. The Kidney Foundation has successfully held black-tie galas and annual
golf outings, and has become known in Cleveland for its "Chili Cook-off," all as
part of its fund-raising mission.
184 Anderson, Whittling Away at Debts While Helping the Poor, PBI EXCHANGE,
Summer 1989, at 3.
185 Id.
1s1 The National Association for Law Placement and Salary Survey reports the
following for types of employment for the class of 1987: 63.5% - Private Practice,
12.5% - Judicial Clerkship, 12.1% - Government, 7.9% - Business and Industry,
3% - Public Interest, 1% - Academic. Huizinga, Where Have All the Students
Gone?, PBI EXCHANGE, Summer 1989, at 2, 10.
187 Redlich, Why Must Law Schools Blur Students' 'Vision'?, Nat'l L.J., Aug.
18, 1986, at S-18, col. 1.
"8 Harold, Shouldn't there be a response to mandatory law school pro bono other
than "Do I have to?", 18 STUDENT LAWYER, Jan. 9, 1990, at 11.
... Huizinga, Law Students Learn from Hands-on Pro Bono Experiences, PBI
EXCHANGE, Summer 1989, at 14. At Tulane, which was the first university to
adopt a mandatory pro bono plan in September 1987, every student must complete
a total of 20 hours of pro bono work in either their second or third year. At Florida
State University, the policy, which goes into effect in September 1990, mirrors
that of Tulane's except that students will certify themselves through an honor
system. The University of Pennsylvania requires that students donate 35 hours
of pro bono work during each of their second and third years of law school. Students
were first affected here in the fall of 1989. Id. (emphasis added).
1 oHuizinga, supra note 186, at 10.
I11 Id. Universities which have followed California's lead and initiated "Just
Ask" programs are: the University of Chicago, the University of Michigan, Har-
vard, Yale, Columbia, and the University of Maryland.
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Clinical programs which expose students to clients and issues they would
not otherwise likely encounter should also be expanded as should edu-
cation in poverty law issues.192 Law schools must "make clear that all
lawyers, whether they work for the Legal Aid Society or a major corporate
law firm have the opportunities and responsibilities to do more than
represent clients.' '1 93
In addition, the academic community can help make public interest
work more financially feasible for those interested. For example, univer-
sity sponsored Loan Repayment Assistance Programs (LRAPs) allow
graduates to defer or eliminate a portion of educational loans while work-
ing in qualifying employment. 9 4 In addition, students can become in-
volved in fund-raising for grants which are awarded to those interested
in pursuing public interest work. Annually, $600,000 is raised for 350
such grants, which provide the funding for law students to work in over
100 legal services offices or to pursue public interest research.195
V. CONCLUSION
It is beyond question that the vast majority of legal needs of the indigent
continue to go unmet. Although judicial recognition of the right to as-
sistance of counsel has been expanding, increased funding by federal and
state governments to meet the increasing need for legal service has not
been forthcoming. Consequently, the legal community will increasingly
be called upon to fill the void left by inadequate government response.
This is evident in the compelling of uncompensated legal assistance by
some courts, as well as in the efforts on the part of bar associations and
courts to develop a standard pro bono service requirement.
1
92 NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 131, at 36.
19, Redlich, supra note 187, at S-18, col. 1.
- Anderson, supra note 184, at 15. Twenty-two law schools (see article for a
complete listing) offer some form of LRAP. Qualifying employment is usually
defined as work for the government, legal services or a nonprofit organization.
Also, some programs phase in total loan forgiveness after a certain number of
years spent in public interest employment. Id.
195 Caudell-Feagan, Students Work Toward Granting Public Service Needs, PBI
EXCHANGE, Summer 1989, at 11. In 1989, 20 law firms throughout the countryparticipated in the National Association of Public Interest Law's "Public Service
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Although the legal profession can be a great catalyst in seeking solu-
tions to the problem, imposing a mandatory pro bono service requirement
on all members of the profession seems to be an extreme and perhaps
imprudent choice as a solution. Relying solely on the establishment of
mandatory pro bono plans, in the face of resistance within the legal
community as well as the constitutional uncertainty of such plans, would
be akin to putting all our eggs in one basket. A better solution to the
problem would be to address the problem on multiple fronts and develop
those sources of legal aid as yet untapped or not fully developed. As
suggested, the legal community needs to take a more active part in mo-
bilizing itself, the legislatures and the public in order to garner the mon-
etary and pro bono support necessary to bring effective legal services to
the indigent.
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